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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOWELL 
JOHN E 
GEORGE 
L. 
vs 
BRADY, 
Plaintiff 
. FAUSETT and 
L. SMITH, 
Defendants 
and Appellant, j 
; and Respondents. ) 
Case No. 14131 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF ON APPEAL 
*** 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action wherein plaintiff seeks the court 
to determine the option portion of an "Agreement To Sell 
Cattle And Lease Land With Option To Purchase" to be unen-
forceable. Defendants seek to uphold the validity of the 
entire agreement. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a trial before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, 
sitting without a jury, the court found the agreement between 
the parties to be valid and enforceable in every respect, 
and decreed that defendants were entitled to specific 
performance of the option should they elect to exercise the 
same. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to have the judgment of the District 
Court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts is misleading and 
inaccurate. It assumes numerous factual matters which were 
in dispute and which were contrary to the weight of the 
evidence. It omits to include a number of very material 
and uncontroverted facts. It quotes numerous bits of 
testimony out of context. And it is filled with statements 
and conclusions not supported by the evidence. For this 
reason the respondents desire to make their own statement of 
facts covering the facts that are relevant and material to 
the issues in this appeal. 
The defendant John E. Fausett (hereinafter referred to 
as Fausett) is a rancher residing in North Duchesne, Utah 
(T-6). He became acquainted with the plaintiff Lowell L. Brady 
(hereinafter referred to as Brady) in approximately February 
of 1972 (T-7). Shortly thereafter Brady approached Fausett 
about purchasing a ranch in Colorado and their discussions led 
to a transaction in April of 1972 wherein Fausett purchased a 
ranch from Brady (T-9). After this initial ranch purchase 
Fausett and Brady became friends. At that time Brady's wife 
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was confined in a rest home near Roosevelt, Utah (T-9). 
Brady, who resided in Colorado, was making numerous trips 
to Roosevelt to visit his wife and as a courtesy to him, 
Fausett offered to let him stay at his ranch in North 
Duchesne (T-9). From the period of April 1972 until July 
1972 Brady stayed overnight on the Fausett ranch thirty-
five to forty nights (T-9). During this time their friend-
ship grew and Fausett made several trips to Brady's ranch 
in Colorado to help him out with his ranching operations 
(T-11,23). Brady's own son who lived on an adjoining ranch 
wouldn't help him or otherwise have anything to do with him 
because of a deal between them that Brady had reneged on 
(T-11,421, 
During the time that Brady was visiting Fausett's 
ranch they talked steadily about Fausett purchasing Brady's 
cattle and also purchasing Brady's ranch in Colorado (T-13). 
Brady's wife died on June 6, 1972 (T-20), after which Brady 
became more serious and more persuasive about wanting to 
sell the ranch. On one occasion he flagged Fausett down on 
the highway when the parties were traveling in opposite 
directions and said "Johnny, can't you come over there and 
buy that place, lease it, take it over, do anything?" (T-26). 
Fausett told him that he couldn't afford the ranch and that 
he did not think Brady should be selling it so soon after his 
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wife had passed away (T-26). Following that incident there 
were many discussions about the purchase of the ranch (T-28) 
the last and most significant of which was a discussion 
which took place on the evening of July 24, 1972. On that 
evening Brady was urging Fausett to lease his ranch in 
Colorado for $25,000.00 per year (T-29,257). Fausett told 
Brady that under no circumstances was he interested in a 
lease. He explained that he had had a bad experience with 
the Ute Indian Tribe on a previous lease where he had spent 
a great deal of money and had done a lot of improvement work 
and then had his lease cancelled (T-29,257). He further 
explained that the Brady ranch was in a run-down condition; 
that it needed fencing, corrals, and other improvements, and 
that he simply was not interested in putting in his time and 
effort into a place that had been neglected for years and 
years on a lease basis (T-29,257). Brady then asked if Fausett 
would lease the property if he were guaranteed an option to 
buy (T-29,257). Fausett said he would be interested if he 
could get financial backing and that evening telephoned 
George L.. Smith in Salt Lake City. Smith told Fausett over 
the telephone that he thought they could get the financing 
(T-29,257). 
Brady then arranged for the parties to meet with his 
attorney, Hugh Colton, the next day in Vernal, Utah (T-29). 
Mr. Colton had been Brady's attorney for many years and had 
• • ' " . • • • • . ' ' . • . 
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represented him in many matters since 1928 (T-134,239). 
The meeting was attended by Fausett, Smith, Brady and 
Attorney Colton (T-68). The defendants Fausett and Smith 
were unrepresented by counsel (T-35,248). Prior to the 
meeting Brady had also discussed the transaction with his 
accountant, Mr. Siddoway, (T-258). At the meeting the 
terms of the proposed transaction were discussed and Brady 
instructed his attorney to draw up a five year lease with 
option to purchase (T-253). There was some discussion on 
the option price. Fausett thought the price should be 
$260,000.00 and Brady was asking $300,000.00 (T-259). After 
some discussion Brady proposed that they split the difference 
and the option price of $280,000.00 was agreed upon (T-14,259). 
At the July 25 meeting there was also discussion 
about the property to be included. Fausett denies that there 
was ever any discussion about Brady wanting to take care of 
his daughters (T-15). However, Brady did make a statement 
about wanting to keep a little area around the Milner cabin 
(T-15). According to the testimony of Fausett, Smith would 
not agree to this and told Brady he could use the property 
during his lifetime but that he didn't want to fight with his 
children after he was dead, whereupon Brady advised his 
attorney to make a clean deal (T-25), meaning to include all 
of the property. Mr. Colton substantiated this testimony 
stating that he recalls that Smith would not agree to any 
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property being withheld from the deal (T-242). It was clearly 
Colton's understanding that the transaction was to include all 
property owned by Brady in Colorado (T-250,252). Later when 
it became necessary to obtain legal descriptions for B.L.M. 
purposes he advised Fausett the descriptions could be obtained 
by taking all of Brady's property descriptions and simply 
deducting the land previously sold under contract to Fausett 
and to Brady's son (T-250). 
Following the meeting on July 25 Mr. Colton prepared 
the "Agreement To Sell Cattle And Lease Land With Option To 
Purchase" (inasmuch as this agreement is the subject of the 
lawsuit a full and complete copy of the same is set forth in 
Appendix "A" of this brief). Fausett and Brady met in Colton's 
office on July 29th and the agreement was signed (T-81,245). 
Prior to the signing Brady had consulted with his Attorney Mr. 
Colton privately about the agreement (T-135). Smith was not 
in Vernal on the 29th and copies were mailed to him in Salt 
Lake City (T-246). 
Between the meeting in Mr. Colton's office of July 25 
and the time the agreement was signed on July 29 another 
conversation was held between Brady and Fausett wherein 
Brady told Fausett he didn't want to go through with the deal. 
Fausett immediately offered to forget the deal and Brady said 
"Let's not get hasty" and that "I don't think that I better 
back out" (T-262). 
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The written agreement between the parties provided 
that the seller Brady was the owner of "a cattle ranch, and 
range lands and Bureau of Land Management permits in Rio 
Blanco and Garfield Counties, Colorado, which he is desirous 
of selling" (R-106, Exhibit 18; See also Appendix "A" to 
this Brief). It then provided at Page 3 that the said land 
leased herein is described as follows: "Description will be 
placed here". The reasons the property descriptions were 
omitted from the written agreement was because Brady's 
abstracts were not available and were being held by Connecticut 
General Insurance Company in Denver (T-128,243). Brady was 
supposed to assist Mr. Colton in obtaining the abstracts so 
that the legal descriptions could be supplied (T-128). There 
is nothing whatsoever in the record to even remotely suggest 
that the descriptions were withheld because the parties could 
not agree upon the land to be included. Nor does this provide 
any basis upon which to conclude that the agreements were 
prepared in haste as has been argued in appellant's brief. 
After the signing of the written agreement on July 29th 
the defendants Fausett and Smith took possession of the 
entirety of the Brady property and have exercised dominion and 
control over it ever since that date (T-121,292). They have 
constructed improvements to the property consisting of sewer 
lines, water systems, wells, corrals, reservoirs, roads, land-
fill, and flood drainage work (T-293,295). The value of these 
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improvements will be approximately $76,000.00 (T-294). In 
addition they have purchased a sprinkling system at a cost 
of $10,000.00 (T-293); ran power to the property at a cost 
of $6,731.70 (T-294); and expended approximately $36,000.00 
worth of caterpillar work (T-295). 
Brady acknowledged in his testimony that the defend-
ants Fausett and Smith have lived up to all of the terms 
of the agreement (T-143). He acknowledges receipt of 
$50,000.00 on July 29, 1972 which was the initial down pay-
ment under the contract (T-120). Thereafter he received an 
additional draft of $2,230.00 on August 30, 1972 (T-122); 
$2,230.00 on September 25, 1972 (T-123); and $2,330.00 on 
October 29, 1972 (T-123); all being pursuant to the agreement 
(T-123). After the final roundup of cattle in the fall of 
1972 the defendants Fausett and Smith paid Brady an additional 
$166,400.00 representing the final payment for cattle under 
the agreement (T-124). Thereafter on January 8, 1973 the 
defendants paid Brady $25,000.00 representing the lease pay-
ment for the ranch for the year 1973 (T-125). On approximately 
December 28, 1973 Brady was paid an additional $25,000.00 
representing the lease payment for the ranch for the year 
1974 (T-126). And in December of 1974 Brady was paid 
$25,000.00 representing the lease payment for the ranch for 
the year 1975 (T-127). Thus, under the very agreement that 
Brady seeks the court to declare unenforceable he has been 
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paid a total of $298,190.00, none of which has ever been 
tendered back to the defendants, and substantial portions 
of which were received even after the filing of this law-
suit. 
At the time of the roundup of cattle in the fall of 
1972 a short addendum contract was entered into between the 
parties relating primarily to the final settlement on the 
purchase of cattle (R-163). The date of the addendum contract 
was October 29, 1972, which was some three months after 
Fausett and Smith had taken full possession of all of Brady's 
Colorado property. The addendum was signed by Lois B. Adams, 
Brady's daughter, who was acting as his attorney-in-fact. 
Brady acknowledged that his daughter had been given full 
authority to sign the agreement (T-129). The addendum contract 
contained the following language: 
"The parties hereby adopt all of the provisions 
of the initial contract and again reaffirm the 
same except as they are specifically amended 
and changed by this addendum." 
On Page 19 of Appellant's brief reference is made to 
erroneous descriptions of property which appear in Bureau of 
Land Management files (R-103, Exhibit 12). Respondents place 
no significance at all to these descriptions. Fausett 
testified that he followed up in transferring Brady's B.L.M. 
grazing rights to himself and Smith, but that he did not at 
any time furnish any legal descriptions to the B.L.M. (T-19). 
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Statements in Appellant's brief about Brady being 
ill at the time of the initial agreement and mentally 
incapable of making rational decisions result solely from 
self-serving statements of Brady and members of his family. 
The only diagnosed illness of Brady was a prostate problem 
(T-43,120). He had been going to doctors for medication 
(TT-120) , but counsel did not see fit to call any doctors to 
testify at the trial. Brady's Attorney, Mr. Colton, was 
called as a witness by the defendants. Counsel for Brady 
had full opportunity to cross examine him and the question 
of Brady's competence during the course of the negotiations 
wasn't even brought up. Fausett also affirmatively testified 
that during the week of negotiations prior to the 25th and 
29th of July, 1972 there was nothing wrong with Brady (T-265). 
He had been staying at Fausett's ranch and eating "like a 
horse11 (T-266) , At the time the contract was actually signed 
he appeared to be in good spirits and there was some kidding 
and teasing going on as to Brady's planned trip to Las Vegas 
and the Go-Go girls there (T-264)• No evidence was offered 
by Brady, and so far as respondents were aware no claim has 
been made, that the option price was unfair or not in 
accordance with the market value of the land. 
After hearing all of the evidence in the case the 
trial court from his advantage position found that Brady was 
fully competent at the time he entered into the agreement of 
-10-
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July 25, 1972; that he advised by competent counsel and 
freely, voluntarily, and understandingly dealt with Fausett 
and Smith in an arms length transaction; and that there was 
no fraud, undue influence or any unconscionable advantage 
taken or committed by Fausett or Smith in any manner whatso-
ever (R-77)• The court further found that there was a 
meeting of the minds and no misunderstanding whatever between 
the parties as to the property to be included in the lease 
and option, of which the defendants had taken possession, and 
that said property consisted of all of the property owned by 
Brady in Rio Blanco and Garfield Counties, less the property 
previously sold under contract (R-77). Based upon these 
findings the court found the agreement of July 25, 1972 to be 
in full force and effect and decreed that defendants Fausett 
and Smith are entitled to specific performance of the option 
should they subsequently elect to exercise it (R-75). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN EQUITY CASES THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE 
PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT. 
Appellant Brady has alleged in his brief that under 
Article VIII, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution the court 
in equity cases may review questions of both law and fact. 
Defendants do not dispute that principle, but merely point 
out that the scope of review in equity cases has been clearly 
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defined in prior adjudications of the court. The findings 
of the trial court will only be upset if the evidence clearly 
preponderates against them. Such findings are presumed to be 
correct; the burden is upon the appellant to show they were 
in error; and where the evidence is in conflict they will not 
be disturbed merely because the Supreme Court may have reviewed 
the matter differentlyf Del Porto vs. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 
495 P.2d 811. The reasons for this rule are summarized in the 
following language of the court taken from Nokes vs. Continental 
Mining and Milling Company, 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P.2d 954: 
" Where there is a conflict in the evidence, 
the finding of the trial court will not be 
disturbed if the evidence preponderates in 
favor of the finding; nor, if the evidence 
thereon is evenly balanced or it is doubt-
ful where the preponderance lies; nor, even 
if its weight is slightly against the find-
ing of the trial court, but it will be over-
turned and another finding made only if the 
evidence clearly preponderates against his 
finding. 
The rule just stated is based upon the 
sound reasoning that some credit should be 
indulged in favor of the findings of the 
trial court because of the advantages pe-
culiar to his position in immediate con-
tract with the trial. It is indeed often 
true that, "the manner hath more eloquence 
than naked words portend." There are in-
tangibles of expression and attitude which 
give color and meaning not apparent from 
words alone. The trial judge feels the 
impact of the personalities of the parties 
and the witnesses: He is able to observe 
their appearance and behavior; their forth-
rightness or hesitancy in answering; their 
frankness and candor, or lack of it. 
Similarly revealing to him are indications 
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of surprise/-anger, resentment or vindict-
iveness, pleasure or other emotions which 
may be discerned from expressions of the 
countenance or voice. He also has some 
advantage in appraising their abilities 
to understand and their capacities to 
remember. Furthermore, he is in a position 
to question the witness himself to clarify 
doubtful points or verify his impressions 
on the matters just mentioned. All of this 
combines to afford him better insight as to 
the truthfulness of the testimony offered 
than does a perusal of the cold record. It 
is a sound and well recognized policy of the 
law to repose some confidence in the verity 
of the actions of the trial court, and not 
to interfere with them unless it clearly 
appears that he is in error." 
See also Stone vs. Stone, 19 Utah 2d 378, 431 P. 2d 802; 
Metropolitan Investment Company v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 
376 P. 2d 940. There is nothing in the record of the 
instant case to show that the trial court misapplied any 
proven facts or made any findings against the weight of 
the evidence. 
POINT II 
THE DESCRIPTION IN THE CONTRACT IS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT. 
Inasmuch as this case involves a contract made in 
Utah between Utah residents for the lease and purchase of 
real property in the State of Colorado, the question may 
arise as to whether Utah or Colorado Taw applies. The general 
rule is to the effect that in actions involving real property, 
the lex loci rei sitae, or the law of the state where the land 
is situated is controlling. 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Conflict of Laws, 
Section. 14, et seq. This may riot be very significant, as the 
authorities from both Utah and Colorado, as well as the law 
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generally, support the position of the respondents. 
A. The General Law. The law recognizes that much 
less certainty and strictness in the description of property 
is demanded in a contract for sale of land than in a deed. 
United Truckmen vs. Larentz (Cal.), 249 P. 2d 352; Ralston vs. 
Lebrain (Cal.), 248 P. 2d 810; 55 Am. Jur., Vendor and Pur-
chaser, Section 8. All that is required in a contract of sale 
is that the land be described with reasonable certainty or 
furnish the means by which the land can be identified with 
reasonable certainty. See exhaustive annotation, 23 A.L.R. 2d 6, 
Sufficiency of Description of Designation of Land in Contract or 
Memorandum of Sale under Statute of Frauds; also 55 Am. Jur., 
Vendor and Purchaser, Section 8. Under said rule, the following 
types of descriptions have been held sufficient to meet the 
Statute of Frauds and compel specific performance of a contract: 
"Fleming Farm on French Creek." Ross vs. Baker, 
72 Pa. 186. 
"Lands Campbell sold to said Preece situated in Shanty 
Ranch." Campbell vs. Preece, 133 Ky. 572, 118 S.W. 373. 
"The lot sold to him in Zoar, Massachusetts." 
Miller vs. Burt, 196 Mass. 395, 82 N.E. 39. 
"Have sold a tract of land on Laurel Fork, Morgan 
County, to party of the second part, Roe Wheeler for $900.00*" 
Wheeler vs. Keeton, 242 S.W. 2d 1013. 
"A horse and lot of land situated on Amity Street, Lynn, 
Massachusetts." Hurley vs. Brown, 98 Mass. 545, 96 Am. Dec. 671. 
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"Land at Sites consisting of 3,281 1/2 acres." 
76 F. 525. 
"80 acres of land 1 3/4 miles N. of Merwin, Bates 
County, Mo." Tracy vs. Berridge, 180 Mo. App. 220, 167 
S.W. 1176. 
"Enfield property." Where defendant held title to 
no other property. Packer vs. Putnam, 57 N.H. 43. 
"83 acre farm in Brunfield." Schafer vs. Faylor, 
(Ohio) 60 N.E. 2d 339. 
"Homestead farm situated on both sides of Quidnick 
Pond Road, so called." Capwell vs. Spencer, 48 R.I. 401, 
137 A. 699. 
"Watts Street house." Harper vs. Battle, 180 N.C. 
375, 104 S.E. 658. 
"Property situated on Sackman Street between Lavonia 
and Riverdale Avenue." Miller vs. Tuck, 88 N.Y. Supp. 495. 
"The farm on which I now live." Bateman vs. Hopkins, 
157 N. Car. 470, 73 S.E. 133. 
"The home place, 80 acres." Davis vs. Davis, 171 Ark. 
168, 283 S.W. 360. 
"My home place and storehouse." Henderson vs. Perkins, 
94 Ky. 207, 21 S.W. 1035. 
"The farm of Mrs. Lula Foor, wife of J. M. Foor, located 
about 2 1/2 miles from Ensor, where Mrs. Foor now lives." 
Foor vs. Mechanics Bank & Trust Company, 144 Ky. 682, 139 S.W. 840. 
"E. H. Sherwood's barn and lot, Seventeenth and Daven-
port." Ballou vs. Sherwood, 32 Neb. 666, 49 N.W. 790. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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.'•'• "Store No. 32 Market Square which I own," Coates vs. 
Lunt, 210 Mass. 314, 96 N.E. 685. 
"Their plantation located on Carson Lake, in the 
Osceola District of Mississippi County, Arkansas." Miller vs. 
Dargan, 136 Ark. 237, 206 S.W. 319. 
"Our Roscoe Farm." Bennett vs. Palmer, 128 111. App. 626. 
"My farm, known as the Jno Baskett Home Farm." 
Posey vs. Kimsey, 146 Ky. 205, 142 S.W. 703. 
"Whatever lots or lands which may be owned by the said 
parties of the first part in the plat of Montville aforesaid." 
St. Paul Land Company vs. Dayton. 42 Minn. 73, 43 N.W. 782. 
Reference is made to the A.L.R. annotation cited above 
for numerous other examples. 
B. The Utah Authorities. In step with the law generally 
are the decisions from Utah involving the sufficiency of a 
legal description. Typical cases are as follows: 
In Eastman vs. Thatcher, 7 Utah 99, 25 P. 728, a 
description of property as a "one-half interest of Hyrum 
Thatcher, of Logan, Utah, in horses and ranch, etc." is a 
sufficient legal description for specific performance where 
it appears from parol evidence that Hyrum Thatcher owned a 
one-half interest in but one ranch. 
In Johnson vs. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 P. 2d 893, it 
was held that an agreement for the sale of an apartment house 
by street address, without indicating in what city, county or 
— 1 £-
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state the property was situated, was not so uncertain as 
to preclude specific performance, where the defendant 
admitted he owned property at a certain stated address in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. The court also held that extrinsic 
evidence may be introduced to show the exact boundaries and 
location of property mentioned in the contract of sale and 
cited the following language from Cummings vs. Nielson, 
42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619: 
"It is elementary that in equity that 
is certain which can be made certain. In 
case . . . certain lands are mentioned by 
name merely in a contract, without giving 
a definite description, the . . . lands 
intended by the contract may always be 
shown by extrinsic parol or documentary 
evidence. See also Pomeroy's Specific 
Performance of Contracts, 3d Edition, 
Section 152." 
In Nielsen vs. Rucker, 8 Utah 2d 302, 333 P. 2d 1067, 
the court specifically enforced a contract wherein the 
property was described as "the dairy farm owned by Glen Nielsen 
and wife." The evidence established that the dairy farm in 
question was the only farm that the Nielsens owned in Brigham 
City, Utah, or elsewhere. In upholding the contract, the court 
again cited the same language from the Cummings vs. Nielsen 
case as set forth above. 
The appellant in this case has relied heavily upon the 
recent case of Davison vs. Robins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P. 2d 1026 
wherein the court refused to specifically enforce a contract 
for lack of a sufficient legal description. The reason why 
the contract failed in the Davison case is because the sale 
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by its terms was not intended to include all of seller's 
land, and the portions to be excluded were subject to 
additional negotiation. In reaching its result, the court 
stated as follows: 
"In the instant action, the agreement in 
clear and unambiguous terms provided that 
the location and description of the land to 
be conveyed was subject to the future mutual 
agreement of the parties. This writing 
constituted a mere expression of a purpose 
to make a contract in the future, for the 
whole matter was contingent on further 
negotiations. The trial court erred in its 
conclusion that the writing constituted a 
valid enforceable contract." 
Under no stretch of the imagination can the Davison case 
be construed to reverse all of the prior case law in the 
State of Utah, nor does it purport to do so. It is clearly 
distinguishable from the case at bar in that according to 
the findings of the court the contract between plaintiff and 
defendants in the instant case included all of plaintiff's 
land thereby leaving nothing open for future negotiation. 
C. The Colorado Authorities. Colorado, likewise, 
follows the general law with respect to sufficiency of legal 
descriptions. An early Colorado case, Ross vs. Purse, 28 P. 
473, wherein no county or state was mentioned in a legal 
description established the general rule. There it was 
stated as follows: 
"If the writing contains indicia by 
reference to which, coupled with the 
defective designation otherwise, the 
identity of the premises can reasonably 
be determined, specific performance may 
be decreed." Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Ross case has been cited in various other Colorado 
decisions, among which is Boyd vs. McElroy, 100 P. 2d 624. 
In the Boyd case, specific performance was decreed in a suit 
involving a lease with an option to purchase in which the 
property was described as "my homestead and additional land 
joining same of 440 acres." The court said: "Everyone 
connected with the deal knew what land was involved, and at 
the trial, the court permitted the description to be read 
into the record from the County Clerk's records." 
Other Colorado cases holding to the same effect as 
the above are Shull vs. Sexton, 390 P. 2d 313 and Thurmon vs. 
Skipton, 403 P. 2d 211. 
Based upon all of the above authorities from Colorado, 
Utah and elsewhere, it becomes obvious that the description 
in the case before the court, that is "a cattle ranch and 
range lands and Bureau of Land Management permits in Rio 
Blanco and Garfield Counties, Colorado," is legally sufficient 
to compel specific performance of the contract. 
POINT III 
IF THERE IS ANY INSUFFICIENCY IN THE DESCRIPTION IT 
HAS BEEN CURED BY DELIVERY OF POSSESSION AND OTHER PART 
PERFORMANCE OF THE AGREEMENT. 
The evidence in this case conclusively showed that 
defendants have taken possession of the entirety of Brady's 
property and operated the cattle ranch since the very 
inception of the agreement. In addition, they have made 
substantial lease payments under the lease option agreement. 
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They have purchased and paid for the cattle. And they have 
made substantial improvements to the property. 
It is generally recognized that a defective description 
may be cured by putting the purchaser in possession. 55 Am. Jur., 
Vendor and Purchaser, Section 8. In the case of Keepers vs. Yocum, 
84 Kan. 554, 114 P. 1063, it was stated as follows: 
"For another reason, the appellants1 
contention must fail. A defective des-
cription of land in a contract of this 
kind may be cured by putting the purchaser 
in possession; that is, the parties may by 
their own conduct under the contract render 
certain what might otherwise be deemed un-
certain. (Citation of authorities) 
The finding of the court, which appears 
to be sustained by the evidence, is that 
the appellee placed the appellants in possess-
ion of the land in Missouri within a few days 
after the contract was entered into, and they 
continued in the possession thereof until 
this action was brought. They disposed of a 
team of horses and other personal property 
included in the contract, received the owner's 
share of the crops raised on the land, and did 
all of these things after they knew that the 
legal title to the land stood in the name of 
Florence N. Briggs, and also after they knew 
that there were certain apparent defects in 
the title of the appellee which required 
attention." 
And in Monday vs. Irwin, 20 N.M. 43, 145 P. 1080, it was held: 
"The argument of counsel is to the effect 
that the contract is so indefinite and uncer-
tain as to the description of the property 
to be conveyed by plaintiff, and the complaint 
so fails to supply the deficiency, that the 
contract cannot be specifically enforced. 
The description in the contract and complaint 
is as follows: 
'40 acres of land adjoining the town of 
Hagerman and known as the Arnold Farms.1 
-20-
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The argument by counsel proceeds to the effect 
that as 'there might have been a dozen 40-acre 
tracts near Hagerman known as the Arnold Farms, 
any one of which would have filled the descrip-
tion in the alleged contract and under the 
allegations in the said complaint relative to 
such description1, the description is insuf-
ficient. He cites authority to the effect that 
if the complaint had alleged that there was 
but one 'Arnold Farm1 adjoining Hagerman, or 
that the parties verbally agreed upon the prop-
erty which would suit the description, the ob-
jection would be overcome. (Citation of 
authorities). 
But counsel overlooked the finding of the 
court that plaintiff had performed all of the 
conditions of his contract, which includes the 
putting of defendant into possession of the 
property, thus identifying the premises. Under 
such circumstances, the defect in the description 
is curecL (Citation of authorities). 
It, therefore, becomes unnecessary for us 
to lay down any general rule as to the suffi-
ciency of description of real estate, to 
authorize the specific performance of contracts 
for the sale thereof." 
The above may be characterized as nothing more than 
an application of the Doctrine of Part Performance to take 
a .case out of the Statute of Frauds. The reason that the 
description is required to be in the contract in the first 
place is merely to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. (See for 
example, Calder vs. Third Judicial District Court, 2 Utah 2d 
309, 273 P. 2d 168 where the court discusses the Statute of 
Frauds as being the reason for the description to be required 
in the written document.) Both Utah and Colorado have 
Statutes of Fraud requiring leases and contracts for interest 
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in land to be in writing. 25-5-3, Utah Code Annotated; 
38-10-108, Colorado Statutes. Both jurisdictions, like-
wise, have statutory provisions relating to part perform-
ance. Those provisions are as follows: 
25-5-8, Utah Code Annotated: Nothing in 
this chapter contained shall be construed 
to abridge the powers of courts to compel 
the specific performance of agreements in 
case of part performance thereof. 
38-10-110, Colorado Statutes: Nothing in 
this article shall be construed to abridge 
the powers of courts of equity to compel 
the specific performance of agreements in 
case of part performance of such agreement. 
The taking of possession under a contract, part payment of 
purchase price, making of improvements, etc., are all singly 
sufficient to take a case out of the Statute of Frauds, let 
alone the combination of these factors as exists in the 
instant case. See Siler vs. Investment Sec. Co., 125 Colo. 
438, 244 P. 2d 877; Zamboni vs. Graham, 104 Colo. 23, 88 P. 2d 
98; Barnes vs. Spangler, 98 Colo. 407, 56 P. 2d 31; Tolley vs. 
Fritsinger, 150 Colo. 440, 374 P. 2d 364; Babcock vs. Bouton, 
85 Colo. 327, 275 P. 908; Rupp vs. Hill, 149 Colo. 48, 367 P 2d. 
746; Ridgeway vs. Pope, 163 Colo. 160, 430 P. 2d 77; VanTrotha vs. 
Bamberger, 15 Colo. 1, 24 P. 883; Knoff vs. Grace, 68 Colo. 527, 
190 P. 526; Brown vs. Johanson, 69 Colo. 400, 194 P. 943; 
Hunt vs. Hayt, 10 Colo. 278, 15 P. 410; In re Roth's Estate, 
2 Utah 2d 40, 269 P. 2d 278; Randall vs. Tracy Collins Trust 
Company, 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P. 2d 480; In re Madsen's Estate, 
123 Utah 327, 259 P. 2d 595. 
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POINT IV 
APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING ANY INVALIDITY 
OF THE AGREEMENT BY REASON OF HIS INCONSISTENT POSITIONS AND 
HIS ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS. 
It is undisputed in this case that Fausett and Smith 
have paid to Brady the total sum of $298,190.00 under the 
contract. It is also clear from the evidence that Fausett 
and Smith were unwilling to purchase Brady's cattle, lease 
his property, and make improvements to the land without 
obtaining an option to purchase. Brady now claims that he 
is entitled to enforce the lease and retain all of the 
benefits therefrom, and yet have no obligation on the option. 
His position in court is to pick and choose those portions of 
the contract that are the most advantageous to him and to 
unilaterally excuse himself from those portions that he doesn't 
want to perform. Unfortunately in doing this he runs squarely 
into the legal principle of estoppel. 
As stated in 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver, 
Section 59, estoppel is frequently based upon the acceptance 
of benefits from a transaction which might have otherwise 
been avoided. Numerous authority is cited for this concept 
which is more fully explained as follows: 
"This doctrine is obviously a branch of 
the rule against assuming inconsistent 
positions, and it has been said that such 
cases are referable, when no fraud either 
actual or constructive is involved, to the 
principles of election or ratification, 
rather than to those of equitable estoppel. 
tThe result produced, however, is clearly the 
same, and the distinction is not usually made. 
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Such estoppel operates to prevent the party 
thus benefited from questioning the validity 
and effectiveness of the matter or transaction 
insofar as it imposes a liability or restric-
tion upon him, or in other words, it precludes 
one who accepts the benefits from repudiating 
the accompanying or resulting obligation." 
Further explanation is made at Section 68, Am. Jur. 2d, 
Estoppel and Waiver, wherein it is stated as follows: 
"Generally speaking, a party will not be 
permitted to maintain inconsistent positions 
or to take a position in regard to a matter 
which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent 
with, one previously assumed by him, at least 
where he had, or was chargeable with, full 
knowledge of the facts, and another will be 
prejudiced by his action. This principle 
operates to preclude one who prevents a thing 
from being done from availing himself of the 
non-performance which he has himself occasioned. 
Similarly, it operates to prevent a person from 
taking advantage of his own wrong. It has also 
been held to prevent one who has been wronged 
in a transaction from subsequently impeaching 
it after having recognized it as valid." 
In the instant case the property covered by the lease 
is exactly the same property as that covered by the option. 
The option and lease are both part of the very same agreement. 
The property is described in exactly the same manner as to 
both. Any Statute of Frauds defense would be equally applicable 
to the five year lease as well as the option. It is difficult 
to conceive of a situation more inconsistent than the position 
taken by the plaintiff in this case. Legal principles of 
estoppel and waiver are applicable to Statute of Frauds cases 
as well as other types of cases 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Sections 565 et seq, 570. 
POINT V 
THE OPTION TO PURCHASE LANDS WAS FULLY SUPPORTED BY 
CONSIDERATION. 
Appellants argument that the option portion of the 
agreement is unsupported by consideration borders on the 
ridiculous. The option was part of an integrated contract, 
for which plaintiff has already received consideration in 
the amount of $298,190.00, not including the other covenants 
and promises which themselves would constitute sufficient 
consideration. Again, as has been already pointed out in 
other portions of this brief, the affirmative testimony of 
Fausett was to the effect that he and Smith were not interested 
in purchasing Brady's cattle or leasing the land without the 
option to purchase. 
It is simple hornbook law that one consideration may 
be sufficient to support as many promises as are bargained 
for (See Restatement of Contracts, Section 83). Williston on 
Contracts, 3rd Ed. Section 137 A in explaining this legal 
concept cites the lease with option to purchase as a typical 
illustration of one consideration supporting several promises. 
If appellant's argument was adopted it would invalidate 
thousands of lease option agreements in this state, a result 
that would be absurd. 
POINT VI 
NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS CASE TO 
SUPPORT ANY POSSIBLE FINDING OF INCAPACITY OR UNDUE INFLUENCE. 
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After hearing all of the evidence in this case the 
court made the following findings: 
"Plaintiff was fully competent at the 
time he entered into the agreement of 
July 25, 1972; he was advised by competent 
counsel;and he freely, voluntarily and 
understandingly dealt with the defendants 
in an arms-length transaction. There was 
no fraud, undue influence, or any uncon-
scionable advantage taken or committed by 
the defendants in any manner whatsoever 
(R-77)." 
A summary of the evidence in support of the above finding 
may be listed as follows: 
1. Brady was represented by counsel 
throughout the entire transaction. 
2. Brady's counsel was called as a 
witness in the case and there was no 
suggestion from him whatsoever that Brady 
was incapable of entering into a binding 
contract. 
3. The defendants Fausett and Smith 
were not represented by counsel at any time 
during the transaction. 
4. Brady consulted with his accountant 
prior to making the transaction. 
5. Brady made self-serving statements 
about being sick and exhausted and being 
under the care of a doctor, yet not one shred 
of medical testimony was offered at the trial. 
6. Fausett affirmatively testified that 
throughout the entire period of the negotia-
tions there appeared to be nothing wrong with 
Brady. 
7. No evidence was ever presented, nor 
was it ever suggested, that the purchase price 
under the option was unfair. 
-26-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
§. The evidence showed that Brady was 
a sophisticated businessman, having been in 
the sheep and cattle business many years, 
and having bought and sold ranches and cattle 
throughout his life. 
9. There was no confidential or 
fiduciary relationship existing between the 
parties. 
Based upon the above it would have been reversible error 
for the court to have made any other finding than it did. 
In order to find undue influence it must appear that the 
free agency of the person influenced was taken away and in 
its place the will of the defendant substituted 25 Am. Jur. 
2d, Duress and Undue Influence Section 36. The evidence in 
this case shows that if any undue advantage was taken at all 
it was not by Fausett or Smith but by Brady himself who 
induced the defendants into paying an inflated price for the 
cattle and lease and then designably breached his agreement 
on the option. 
Aside from all of the above, the law is clear that a 
contract made under undue influence is merely voidable and 
capable of being ratified 25 Am. Jur. 2d Duress and Undue 
Influence Section 41. The undisputed evidence shows that the 
agreement was ratified in the following respects: 
1. By accepting lease and cattle payments under the 
contracts over a period of several years after the contract 
was made, and during periods in which no undue influence was 
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claimed or could possibly have been exerted. 
2. By the execution of a subsequent written agree-
ment wherein the parties "hereby adopt all of the provisions 
of the initial contract and again reaffirm the same." 
The evidence conclusively establishes a ratification 
even if the trial court had made an adverse finding on the 
undue influence issue (which it did not). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as 
cited herein, respondents respectfully request the court to 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS, 
WEST & SCHAERRER 
David E. West 
Ben E. Rawlings 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
John C. Beaslin 
185 North Vernal Avenue, #1 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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APPENDIX "A" 
AGREEMENT TO SELL CATTLE 
AND LEASE LAND WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE 
THIS AGREEMENT made this 25th day of July, 1972, by and between LOWELL 
L. BRADY, hereinafter called Sellen and GEORGE L. SMITH and JOHN E. FAUSETT, 
'•'''•£ 
hereinafter called Buyers; 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the Seller is now the owner of certain cattle, a cattle ranch, and 
range lands and Bureau of Land Management permits in Rio Blanco and Garfield Counties, 
Colorado, which he is desirous of selling, and; 
WHEREAS, The Buyers are desirous of buying the cattle and leasing the said 
lands and permits with an option to buy the same, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between the Seller and Buyers 
as follows: 
1. That the Seller hereby agrees to sell to the Buyers, and the Buyers hereby 
agree to buy from the Seller, the following described cattle at the prices shown: 
Approximately 400 range cows, with 1972 calves by their 
side (pairs), (it being understood by the parties hereto that $400,00 per pair 
any calf born and following its mother prior to November 
1, 1972, such cow and cali shall be designated a pair, . ' 
and that if calved after November 1, such cow shall be 
considered a dry cow.) 
• 
1S5 dry cows „ • * $280,00 per head 
26 bulls • ' . $500.00 per bull 
It being understood that the above numbers are approximate but that it is all 
the cattle the Seller has, and Buyers agree to take whatever number Seller 
delivers to them. Provided unmerchantable cattle (which are sick or crippled) 
shall not be covered by this agreement, and that should thereibe any steers 
or yearling heifers gathered they are not covered by this agreement. 
2 . The Buyers agree to buy the above described cattle at the prices above 
mentioned and to pay Seller therefor as follows: 
$50,000.00 to be paid upon the execution of this agreement, and the balance 
to be datermindd and paid at the time said cattle are delivered to Buyers-
^Ms 
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3 . Seller agrees to deliver the said cattle at what is known as Seller's Home-
stead Ranch (the Daisy Kirk place) and to begin the delivery thereof as the cattle are . 
gathered off the summer range, which shall be not later than November 1# 1972. . 
4 . The Buyers agree to receive the said cattle as gathered which shall not be 
later than November 1, 1972, at the above designated place, or at such other place 
as they may agree to with Seller, and as the cattle are delivered, the brand of the 
Buyers will be placed on the cows and bulls, and the calves taken off the cows and 
trucked away from the ranch. The cows and calves will be counted as the cows are 
branded and as the calves are loaded in the trucks. It being understood that all calves 
not loaded in trucks shall be the property of the Seller until delivered as above provided. 
Provided, that all cattle later found not branded with Buyer's brand shall be the property 
of Seller, and as they are found, they will be gathered and Seller notified so that he 
may be present when they are branded, and when branded, he will be entitled to the 
payment therefor in accordance with the above selling prices. It being understood 
that Seller retains all right, title and interest in and to his brands. 
• 5 . The Buyers agree that they will cooperate with the Seller in rounding up 
the said cattle. It being understood by Buyers that the cattle are scattered over a 
wide area of range, and that the roundup may take considerable time. Both Seller and 
Buyers agree to supply the help necessary to make a complete ride of the range and 
delivery of the cattle. 
6. As a further consideration, Buyers agree to take immediate possession of 
the said cattle and to, at their expense, herd, care for, and provide at least one 
rider for the said cattle and do all things necessary to care for the said cattle in a 
herdsmanlike manner, and to pay Seller for pasturage on the said cattle until November 
1, 1972, $4.00 per month for each pair (cow with calf) and $3.50 per month for each 
dry cow and bull, and to pay this pasture bill monthly beginning on August 31 , and 
to pay on September 30 and October 31. This pasture bill to be in lieu of interest on 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
W ^ j ? I 
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7 . SoAic:*" furtr.er agrees co and nerooy -eases to Buyers me io*iGwmg cescribed 
real property situated in I\io Blanco and Garfield Counties/ Colorado for a period of 
five years , at an annual rernal of $25,CCC.C0 ^>o: year. The year 's rental to be paid 
on or before January 2, 1973, and on January 2 of every year thereafter during the five 
year term or »ms ,».ease. • 
Description wix* oe p^scec nere . 
Together with all improvements, appurtenances / rights of way, water 
rignts anc grazing rignts tnereunto oo*or*gmg, 
Reserving , however, to tne Seller, en.unaivided three-fourths interest 
in whatever oi-., gas ana ozner minera* rignts he may now have in, upon, 
or unaer tne a^ove cescn^ea -anas , togetner witn tne right of ingress 
ana egress ior tne purpose ci exploration ana development of tne said 
01^, g a s , ana ojner minora* r ignts . 
. S. Z!he Buyers agree to pay, in addition to the above mentioned annual renta l , 
a . i reai estate t axes , as tne sarnie become cue and to pay the same promptly when due 
so a s to not create a ±ien against tne said property, and to pay taxes on all personal 
property that they may have on the said described property, beginning with the taxes 
for 2973. Seller agrees to pay !C/ l2 ths of the taxes for 1972, and the Buyers agree 
to pay 2 / l2 :hs of 1572 taxes . 
£». As a furtaor consideration of the soid l ease , Seller grants unto the 3uyers 
an option to purcnase tne soovo aescnoec property at tne Q'^d ox tne five-year lease 
p~r*oc, ma-._air.g a** improvements, appurtenances, rignts or way, water r ights , and 
*-.. gracing .'^.MS, ior *ne ^um or ^.iwv.-w^.C*. Buyers agree tnat upon the exercising 
cf this option, the Buyers shall pay to the Seller 29 percent of the said $230, GOO. CO, n 
%.*** to pay tr.o oa*ur.co due in live e^ual payments beginning on January 2 , 1973. 
-M 
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buyers s n c * a*sc pay tne Sei.er interest on tne unpaid balances at the annuai race of 
•i p«.«*can. more *.nan tne * oaera.. *r..'»crmeuiate o**carw *>inx 3 interest is lor tnat year . 
10. The Buyers agree that in the event they exercise this option to purchase 
the said property as described / they wil l , at that time, and upon the Buyer delivering 
to then; a Warranty Deed to the said property, to execute a Promissory Note and secure 
the payment thereof by a "D^ed of Trust covering the above described property, water 
ana range rignts • 
ime is of the essence of this agreement, and should the Buyers fail to make \ 
the payments as herein provided, then all payments made upon the execution of this 
agreement or at any time suosec;uent thereto shall be considered as rental and liQuidatedj 
c»c»mages« 
Ihe provisions of this agreement shall extend to tand.'bind, the legal representa-
t i ve s , a ss igns , and heirs of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITXZSS V /HZAZOP, the parties have hereunto set their hands the day and 
year first above written. 
4
 /Lowell I^Erady, Seller 
^-r~7/ 
'•tryy^-K. 
George^ . Smiih', "* 
« , < * « . . * * ' ^J* W/-.4 ) 
^ 7 / y> o ^ c 
. y jonn £.• aTousett, buyers f - , . , » 
) s * . ' 
On this day of July, IS ' '2 , personally appeared before me Lowell L. Brady, 
Z. -O-'vs L. w.*.*tn, Jonn ^ . r au je i t , tne parties to cne aoovo entit^ea Agreement wno 
*«.'jOi*.o»*-,f ao.\nov/*owgea to me tnat tncy signea tne same. • 
•//, <-/::• / . S> A,.,- / 
•«.y vvitiiiuuu*1 *-»•« W * . - ' * « V » * 
Xotary Public 
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